Special Issues on the Dialogical Self:   

In Counselling Psychology Quarterly

Special Issue: The Dialogical Approach to Counselling Theory, Research and Practice. Guest Editors: Hubert Hermans and William J. Lyddon.

2006, 19 (1), 1-120.

Hubert J. M. Hermans & William J. Lyddon. Counselling as multivoiced and dialogical, 1-4.

Hubert J.M. Hermans. Moving through three paradigms, yet remaining the same thinker, 5-26.

William J. Lyddon, David R. Yowell & Hubert J.M. Hermans. The self-confrontation method: Theory, research, and practical utility, 27-44

Darlys J. Alford, William J. Lyddon & Roxanne Schreiber. Adult attachment and working models of emotion, 45-56.

Paul H. Lysaker & John T. Lysaker. A typology of narrative impoverishment in schizophrenia: Implications for understanding the processes of establishing and sustaining dialogue in individual psychotherapy, 57-68

Giancarlo Dimaggio, Dario Catania, Giampaolo Salvatore, Antonio Carcione & Giuseppe Nicolo. Psychotherapy of paranoid personality disorder from the perspective of dialogical self theory, 69-88.

Michael Guilfoyle. Using power to question the dialogical self and its therapeutic application, 89-104.

Robert A. Neimeyer. Narrating the dialogical self: Toward an expanded toolbox for the counselling psychologist, 105-120.

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In Culture & Psychology

Special Issue: Culture and the Dialogical Self:

Theory, Method, and Practice

2001, 7(3), 243-408

Hubert J. M. Hermans,   The Dialogical Self: Toward a Theory of Personal and Cultural Positioning, 243-281.

Commentaries:

Glenn Adams & Hazel Rose Markus, Culture as Patterns: An Alternative Approach to the Problem of Reification, 283-296

Sunil Bhatia & Anjali Ram, Locating the Dialogical Self in the Age of Transnational Migrations, Border Crossings and Diasporas, 297-309

Alan Roland,  Another Voice and Position: Psychoanalysis Across Civilizations, 311-321

Method and Practice

Hubert J. M. Hermans, The Construction of a Personal Position Repertoire: Method and Practice, 323-366

Commentary

Miguel M. Goncalves &  Joao Salgado, Mapping the Multiplicity of the Self, 367-377

Commentaries on Theory, Method and Practice

Nandita Chaudhary, & Sujata Sriram, Dialogues of the Self, 379-392

David Yau-Fai Ho, & Shui-Fun Fiona Chan, Si-Qing Peng, & Aik Kwang Ng, The Dialogical Self: Converging East-West Constructions, 393-408

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In Theory & Psychology

Special Issue on the Dialogical Self, 2002, 12 (2), 147-280

Hubert J. M. Hermans, The Dialogical Self as a Society of Mind: Introduction, 147-160

Ingrid Josephs "The Hopi in Me": The Construction of a Voice in the Dialogical Self: From a cultural Psychological Perspective, 161-174

Marc Lewis, The Dialogical Brain: Contributions of Emotional Neurobiology to Understanding the Dialogical Self, 175-190

Alan Fogel, Ilse de Koeyer, Francesca Bellagamba, & Holly Bell, The Dialogical Self in the First Two Years of Life: Embarking on a Journey of Discovery, 191-206

Paul Lysaker, & John Lysaker, Narrative Structure in Psychosis: Schizophrenia and Disruptions in the Dialogical Self, 207-220

Mikael Leiman, Toward Semiotic Dialogism: The Role of Sign-Mediation in the Dialogical Self, 221-236

John Barresi, From "the Thought is the Thinker" to "the Voice is the Speaker": William James and the Dialogical Self, 237-250

Jaan Valsiner, Forms of Dialogical Relations and Semiotic Autoregulation within the Self, 251-266

John Beebe, An Archetypal Model of the Self in Dialogue, 267-280

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In Journal of Constructivist Psychology

Special Issue on the Dialogical Self and Psychotherapy, 2003, 16 (2), 89-212

Hubert J. M. Hermans, The Construction and Reconstruction of a Dialogical Self, 89-130

Mick Cooper, ''I-I'' and ''I-Me'': Transposing Buber's Interpersonal Attitudes to the Intrapersonal Plane, 131-153

Giancarlo Dimaggio, Gianpaolo Salvatore, Cristina Azzara, and Dario Catania, Rewriting Self-Narratives: The Therapeutic Process, 155-181

Leni M.F. Verhofstadt-Deneve, The Psychodramatical "Social Atom Method": Dialogical Self in Dialectical Action, 183-202

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In Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research

Special Issue on the Dialogical Self in a Global and Digital Age, 2004, 4 (4), 297-405 (initiated by Beatrice Ligorio, University of Bari, Italy, with Hubert Hermans as guest editor)

Hubert J.M. Hermans, Introduction: The dialogical self in a global and digital age, 297-320

Vincent W. Hevern, Threaded identity in cyberspace: Weblogs and positioning in the dialogical self, 321-336

Maria Beatrice Ligorio, & Annarita Celeste Pugliese, Self-positioning in a text-based virtual environment, 337-354

Michela Cortini, Giuseppe Minnini, & Amelia Manuti, The diatextual construction of the self in Short Message Systems, 355-388

Van Halen, C., & Janssen, J., The usage of space in dialogical self-construction: From Dante to cyberspace, 389-405

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For Dutch readers:

In: Tijdschrift voor Orthopedagogiek

Themanummer over de waarderingstheorie, de zelfkonfrontatiemethode en de 'dialogical self'' (december 2002)

Hubert J.M. Hermans, Waarderingstheorie en zelfkonfrontatiemethode: de affectieve structuur van het zelfverhaal, 603-620

Jos J. Louwe, & Cok A. Balkestein., Toepassing van de zelfkonfrontatiemethode bij kinderen; verslag van de eerste klinische ervaringen, 621-629

Peter Zomer, De Team Konfrontatie Methode (TKM) in de steigers, 630-644

Mieke M. Wijdeveld, Een stap dichterbij jezelf, 645-653

Riet J.M. Fiddelaers-Jaspers, Achter het masker schuilt de rouw: verliesverwerking bij jongeren, 654-669

Rene Gulikers, Koert H.W. de Blok, Judith J. Peters,. & Hubert J.M. Hermans, Interne en externe validering van de kinder-ZKM, 670-678

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The following is a chapter that was published in the 2002 issue of Advances in Personal Construct Psychology (Edited by Robert Neimeyer and Greg Neimeyer; Westport, Ct: Praeger) (pp. 3-38):

THE PERSON AS A MOTIVATED STORYTELLER:

VALUATION THEORY AND THE SELF-CONFRONTATION METHOD

Hubert J.M. Hermans

As a researcher in the field of personality I started, at the end of the sixties, to construct tests for the measurement of achievement motivation and fear of failure (e.g., Hermans, 1970). Dissatisfaction, however, with the objectifying and impersonal nature of these tests, with the separation between assessment and change, and with the rather limited value range of such instruments, motivated me to search for alternatives. One of the authors who inspired me during this scientific exploration was George Kelly (1955) because in his work I found at least three elements which liberated me from the straitjacket of mainstream trait psychology: the personal and idiographic nature of his work, the relational approach in which the client is considered as a colleague, and his supposition that a multiplicity of building blocks (personal constructs in his case) are organized into a system and could be assessed using a grid methodology.

Now, almost 30 years later, I am still interested in my original field, human motivation, albeit in a quite different way from the period mentioned above. In the meantime, developments in the area of the psychology of the self in the line of William James and the recent upsurge of narrative psychology have stimulated me to investigate the construction of personal meanings or, using a more dynamic term, the process of valuation, in which the person is continuously involved. Moreover, my cooperation with Els Hermans-Jansen, a psychotherapist, and our common experiences with a variety of clients have also had a major impact on the work presented in this chapter. Finally, I came to realize that the most appropriate way to characterize the way in which people give form to their own lives is to phrase it in terms of the metaphor of the motivated storyteller (Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995) which provides a fertile starting point for both theory and practice.

The several components of this metaphor, "story," "telling," and "motivation" will be briefly addressed before elaborating on its theoretical, methodological and practical implications.

Stories as the Organization of Events in Time and Space

People of all ages and cultures have used stories or narratives (myth, folklore, fairy tale, legend, epic, opera, motion picture, biography, novel, television play, personal anecdote, etc.) to give meaning to their environment and their own lives. Sarbin (1986), one of the main advocates of a narrative appoach, views story as a way of organizing episodes, actions, and accounts of actions in time and space. He suggests that narrative organizes our fantasies and daydreams, our unvoiced stories, our plans, memories, even our loving and hating.

Narratives or stories are for Sarbin part of the root metaphor of contextualism (Pepper, 1942). The central element of this metaphor is the historical event that can only be understood when it is located in the context of time and space. Sarbin (1986) argues that contextualism presupposes an ongoing texture of elaborated events, each being influenced by preceding and following episodes, and by multiple agents who engage in actions. There is a constant change in the structure of situations and in positions occupied by spatially-located actors who are oriented to the world and toward one another as intentional beings. Often these actors have opposite positions as though performing on a stage as protagonists and antagonists, entertaining relationships of love, hate, agreement, or disagreement. The thoughts, feelings, and actions of the protagonists can only be understood as emerging from their relationships with antagonists who, often unpredictably, co-construct reality.

A large proportion of our experiences and actions receive a narrative structure as McAdams (1993) has extensively argued. A concept that clearly demonstrates this structure is the so-called "Quixote principle" orginally formulated by Levin (1970) and further developed by Sarbin (1990). This principle refers to identity shaping through reading or listening to stories. The reader is at first a participant in the story, identifying with one of the main characters. After the role of this character is enacted in the imagination, it is enacted overtly and guides the reader's behavior. The story of Don Quixote illustrates how a person forms an identity from reading fictional or historical tales and then proceeds to validate the newly acquired identity in daily life. Before he named himself Don Quixote, the lonely sixteenth-century Spanish nobleman, Alonzo Quesada became impressed by heroic deeds of chivalry, as a result of intensive reading of the adventures of knights-errant. After creating silent fantasies in which he participated vicariously as actor or spectator in the stories he read, he took the step of acting on his imaginations and adopted an appropriately knightly name, Don Quixote. This name symbolized the heroship that he needed to transform the world into something better.

An historical case that exemplifies the Quixote principle is Goethe's novel The Sorrows of Young Werther, published in 1774. The book was written in a time when death, especially death by one's own hands, had a romantic flavor. In the literature of that time there was even an aura of nobility and heroism about death and dying, especially if one composed one's own death scenario. Werther's struggle with rejection and his ultimate suicide was taken as a guiding example by young men of fashion, particularly by those who experienced unrequited love. There was a real Werther epidemic following the publication of the book. The typical suicide was performed in full Werther costume: Blue tailcoat, yellow waistcoat, and boots. The pistol was aimed just above the eye (Sarbin, 1990, p. 55). The Quixote principle not only demonstrates the influence of imagination on action but also the cultural context of narratives.

Telling in Actual and Imaginal Relationships

When there is a story, there is always someone who tells the story to someone else. It is the dialogical reciprocity between teller and listener that makes storytelling a highly dynamic interactional phenomenon.

Two forms of dialogue structure our daily experiences: imaginal and actual dialogues. In the lives of normal people these forms of dialogues are certainly not separated but rather side by side and even interwoven they are part of our narrative construction of the world. In her book, Invisible Guests, Watkins (1986) argues that, even when we are outwardly silent, we find ourselves communicating with our critics, our parents, our consciences, our gods, our reflection in the mirror, with the photograph of someone we miss, with a figure from a movie or a dream, with our babies, with our pets and even with our plants and flowers. When we plan to visit our friends we "see" and "hear" them in our imagination before we actually meet them, and when we have left them, we re-enact parts of the conversation. Imaginal interactions certainly have a pervasive influence on real interactions. Before I go to a meeting I imagine the people who will attend the meeting and I have expectations of what they will say. During the meeting I imagine what the participants are thinking even if they are outwardly silent, and after the meeting I re-enact what has been said and I may inwardly criticize myself or others with the intention to act differently next time. In other words, imaginings are important facto rs influencing actual behavior.

Caughey (1984), a social anthropologist, has also studied the phenomenon of "imaginary social worlds." He did fieldwork on Fáánakker, a pacific island in Micronesia and in the Margalla Hills of Pakistan and compared these cultures with North American culture. Caughey concluded that imaginal interactions are in no way restricted to non-Western cultures. He estimated that the "real" social world of most North-Americans includes between 200 and 300 people (e.g., family, friends, acquaintances, colleagues). Moreover, their worlds are populated by a swarming throng of other beings, with whom no face-to-face contact exists. Caughey divides them into three groups: (a) media figures with whom the individual engages in imaginal interactions (a suburban grandmother is described who had a lifelong "affair" with Frank Sinatra despite forty years of marriage); (b) purely imaginary figures produced in dreams and fantasies; (c) imaginal replicas of parents, friends, or lovers who are treated as if they were really present. Caughey argues, as did Watkins (1986), that imaginal dialogues and interactions exist side by side with actual interactions (e.g., "If my mother could see me now...").

Motivation, Plot Structure, and Story Themes

Stories are populated by motivated actors who are purposefully oriented to the world. The example of a detective story (Hermans and Kempen,1993) may serve as an example. Confronted with a murder, the detective begins the task of finding the reasons or motives "behind" the deed. When detectives begin their investigations, and not yet know the motive (e.g., revenge) behind the actions of the perpetrator, many observations may seem incoherent or even confusing. In this phase the detective is not yet able to see if a particular observation is "to the point. " In the course of time, however, the imaginative detective may find out that observations, hitherto incomprehensible, are part of an elaborate pattern of events that together form an insightful plot. The theme organizes the events so that a coherent plot structure emerges.

The example of the detective story reveals a more general feature of narratives, the dialectic relationship between event and plot. As Polkinghorne (1988) has argued, the meaning of a particular event is produced by the interaction between event and plot. Events do not dictate any plot, and not every plot is appropriate to any given set of events. In order to arrive at a meaningful plot structure, it is necessary to move back and forth between plot and events. According to the principle of "best fit," a proposed plot structure is compared with the events at hand, and revised accordingly. In this comparative process, a particular theme guides the selection of the events and the organization or revision of the plot. The theme allows the pulling together of the events as interrelated parts of a story.

Novels, movies, fairy tales, myths, program music and other kinds of stories may be organized around a broad variety of themes, such as jealousy, revenge, tragic heroism, injustice, unattainable love, the innocence of a child, inseparable friendship, discrimination, and so forth. This thematic variety, however, does not exclude that culture provides us with a limited amount of basic themes that function as organizing frames for the understanding and interpretation of life events. There are different ways of classifying themes as structuring devices of stories.

Frye (1957) argued that themes in narratives are rooted in the experience of nature, and in the evolution of the seasons in particular. Spring has inspired comedy, expressing people's joy and social harmony after the threatening winter. Summer, representing abundance and richness, gives rise to the romance, which depicts the triumph of good over evil, and of virtue over vice. (Note that for Frye romance is not limited to attraction between people.) Autumn, representing the decline of life and the coming death of the winter, gives rise to tragedy. Finally, in the winter satire is born because in this season comes the awareness of the fact that one is ultimately a captive of the world, rather than its master. In satire, people find an opportunity to criticize their own fate.

Whereas Frye's classification of story themes is based on the cyclical movements of nature, Gergen and Gergen (1988) have proposed a classification of a more linear type. They consider narratives as changing over time toward a desirable end state. A progressive narrative tells of increments toward an end state. An individual telling such a narrative might say: "I am learning to overcome my shyness and be more open and friendly with people." A regressive narrative is focused on decrements in the orientation toward a desirable end state. An individual might say: "I can't control the events of my life anymore." Finally, in a stable narrative the individual remains essentially unchanged with respect to the valued end point. Somebody involved in such a narrative might say, "I am still as attractive as I used to be."

The psychological motives of the actors may also be taken as a starting point for the classification of narratives. A classic example is Murray's (1938) system of needs and his use of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). A picture may invite subjects to tell stories with different themes (e.g., achievement, affiliation, dominance, sex, etc.). The underlying assumption is that the themes, expressed in the stories, reflect the subjects' more or less unconscious needs. Inspired by Murray later investigators used TAT procedures to assess people's motives or needs: Achievement motive (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953), power (Winter, 1973), affiliation (Boyatzis, 1973), and the opposition of power and intimacy (McAdams, 1985). Such literatures reflect a close relationship between psychological motives and narratives.

In summary, three suppositions underlie the narrative approach presented in this chapter. First, stories acknowledge both the perception of reality and the power of imagination. Whereas stories combine fact and fiction (Sarbin, 1986), the telling of stories runs through real and imaginal dialogues (Watkins, 1986; Caughey, 1984). Second, space and time are basic components of storytelling. Stories always imply a temporal organization of events, and a plot structure that meaningfully relates past, present, and future. At the same time, stories are organized around actors who, as protagonist and antagonist, have opposite positions in a real or imaginal space (e.g., imagining what my father would say if he were still alive and was with us on the birthday of my child). Third, both the storyteller and the actors in the stories told are intentional beings who are motivated to reach particular goals which function as organizing story themes in their narratives. Story themes and psychological motives bring coherence and direction in events that are otherwise fragmented and dispersed over time and space.

Valuation theory: Personal Meanings in the Self-Narrative

Valuation theory (Hermans, 1987a,b, 1988, 1989; Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995; ) is based on the metaphor of the motivated storyteller. In this theory the three components (story, telling, and motivation) of the guiding metaphor are brought together as parts of an articulated conceptual system. (For a discussion of this theory and its methodology in the context of recent trends in constructivism see Neimeyer, Hagans & Anderson, 1998.)

Personal Valuation, Self-Narrative, and Self-Reflection

In agreement with such phenomenological thinkers as James (1894) and Merleau-Ponty (1945) the starting point of valuation theory is in the historical nature of human experience and in its spatio-temporal orientation. The individual lives in the present and is, from a specific point in space and time, oriented to past and future and to the surrounding world. The individual not only orients successively to different parts of his or her spatio-temporal situation, but also brings those parts together in an organized story or self-narrative.

The central concept, "valuation" refers both to the process of meaning construction and its product in which the events of a self-narrative are organized. A valuation has a positive (pleasant), negative (unpleasant) or ambivalent connotation in the eyes of the individual. Personal valuations, as subjective constructions of personal experiences, refer to a broad range of phenomena such as: a dear memory, a pleasant activity, a good talk with a friend, a disappointment in the contact with a significant other, a particular source of satisfaction in one's work, a physical handicap, an unreacheable ideal, etc. During different periods of one's life, different valuations may emerge because one's reference point is constantly changing. As a result of the act of self-reflection different valuations are brought together into an organized valuation system in which one valuation is given a more prominent place than another.

The process term "valuation" is preferred rather then the more static term "value" because telling one's self-narrative requires a process of self-reflection. This process can be traced to James's (1890) classic distinction between I (the self-as-knower) and Me (the self-as-known) as the two main components of the self. The I, or the self-as-knower, continuously organizes and interprets experience in a purely subjective manner. Three features characterize the I: Continuity, distinctness, and volition. The continuity of the self-as-knower is manifested by a "sense of personal identity" and a "sense of sameness" through time (p. 332). A feeling of distinctness, of having an existence separate from others, is also intrinsic to the I. A sense of personal volition is expressed by the continuous appropriation and rejection of thoughts by which the self-as-knower functions as an active processor of experience. Each of these features (continuity, distinction, volition) imply the awareness of self-reflectivity that is essential for the self-as-knower (Damon and Hart, 1982). In other words, the concept of "valuation" presupposes an I as an active processor of experience.

In defining the Me, or self-as-known, James (1890) was aware that there is a gradual transition betweeen Me and Mine. In a famous statement, he identified the Me as the empirical self that in its broadest sense is described as all that the person can call his or her own, " not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account" (p. 291). These primary elements or constituents indicate for James a basic feature of the self, its extension. The incorporation of the constituents indicates that the self is not an entity, closed off from the world, and having an existence in itself, but, rather, extended toward specific aspects of the environment (Rosenberg, 1979). With this view on the extension of the self, James, in fact, transcends the strict boundaries of a self-contained, essentialistic self. Because the Mine (body, other person) belongs to the (extended) self, the self, in its broadest sense, is part of the environment, and the environment is part of the self. In terms of the present theory: the process of valuation presupposes an extending, spatially-structured self.

Telling one's Self-Narrative

In valuation theory the notion of self-reflection is closely related to the notion of telling. When people narrate the events of their lives, they reflect at the same time upon themselves taking the position of the listener into account. Of crucial importance for the relation betweeen self-narrative and self-reflection is Sarbin's (1986) thesis that James, Mead, Freud and others emphasized the distinction between the I and the Me, and their equivalents in other European languages, because of the narrative nature of the self. The uttered pronoun I stands for the author, the Me for the actor or narrative figure. In this configuration, the I can imaginatively construct a story with the Me as the protagonist. In such narrative construction the self as author can imagine the future and reconstruct the past (Crites, 1986).

Sarbin's (1986) translation of the I-Me distinction into a narrative framework has an important advantage. It presupposes an I which is involved in a process of telling something to someone else. The I is not only bound to the Me (I think about myself) but also to another I with whom the person is involved in a narrative relationship (I tell something about myself to you). The implication of this dialogical view of the self is that the content of the narration is dependent on the nature of the relationship in which the teller is involved. The I as telling or writing author has a public and tells and writes with this audience in mind. The audience then co-constructs the story and its content.

In everyday life the context-dependent nature of one's self-narrative can easily be observed. People tell, at least to some extent, different self-narratives to different people and in different contexts. People may tell things to their friends which they do not tell to a stranger and in their contact with a psychologist they may tell about confidential things, if they feel safe enough to do so. Different professional contacts also evoke different self-narratives. For example, in their contact with a medical doctor people may "somatize" psychological complaints (e.g., "I have stomach pain") whereas in their contact with a psychotherapist the psychological or social nature of such complaints may receive more attention ("I have a conflict with my wife").

For the present theory the context-dependence implies that there is no such thing as an "inventory of valuations," a supposedly fixed set of concerns which are waiting to be uncovered by the telling client or the examining psychologist. Rather, the psychologist as an active listener or probing interrogator signficantly influences both the form and content of what the person tells. In other words, the process of valuation, as a context-dependent activity, is a co-constuction of client and psychologist.

The Motivational and Affective Basis of Self-Narrative

People are not simply storytellers, they are passionate storytellers. That is, they tell those parts of their self-narratives in which they are affectively involved. They do not tell their stories like an "objective" historiographer who dispassionately relates events from a detached point of view. Rather, people tell their personal stories selectively and colorfully, placing emphasis on those events or combinations of events which have an affective meaning or which appeal to them emotionally

In valuation theory it is assumed that each valuation, as a unit of meaning in one's self-narrative, carries an affective connotation and that basic motives are reflected in this connotation. That is, each valuation has a certain degree of personal involvement and reflects a particular set of feelings (a particular affective profile). When we know which types of affect are characteristic of a particular valuation, we know something about the valuation itself. This also implies that the affective meaning of a valuation cannot be separated from it. How does this conception of the self originate in James' work?

As already referred to, James defined the self as "...the sum total of all he can call his. . . ". Having said this, James immediately went on to say: "All these things give him the same emotions. If they wax and prosper, he feels triumphant; if they dwindle and die away, he feels cast down, not necessarily in the same degree for each thing, but in much the same way for all" (p. 291-292). In other words, James conceives of the self as extended to a manifold variety of things, and reacting with the same set of emotions. Similarly, we conceive of valuations as the phenomenological variety of narrative concerns relevant to an individual, associated with the same set of affective states (e.g., one may experience anxiety and anger in relation to both one's father and one's superior).

The phenomenological richness of personal valuations, which may vary not only between individuals but also within a single individual across time and space, represents the manifest level of the self (see Figure 1). At the latent level, however, a limited number of basic motives exist that are reflected in the affective component of the valuation system. Study of the affective component can therefore reveal which particular motive is active in a particular valuation and in the system as a whole. Note that the latent-manifest distinction poses the problem of generativity: How can humans generate on the basis of a finite set of experiences, an almost unlimited set of surface expressions? Both Freud and Chomsky anwered this problem, each in their own ways and each using their specific terminology, by supposing a distinction between a latent and a manifest level (Freud) or between a deep and surface level (Chomsky), the deeper of which constitutes a limited set of basic motives or operations.

Two basic motives, in particular, have been taken into consideration to characterize the affective component of the valuation system: the striving for self-enhancement, or S motive (self-maintenance and self-expansion), and the longing for contact and union with the other, or O motive (participation with other people and the surrounding world). This distinction concerning the basic duality of human experience has been present in the writings of various authors: Bakan (1966) viewed agency and communion as fundamental dynamic principles; Angyal (1965) relied on the concept of autonomy (or self-determination) and homonomy (or self-surrender); Klages (1948) considered Bindung (solidification) and Lösung (dissolution) to be two basic motives; McAdams (1985) has distinguished power and intimacy as basic motives in a narrative context. Recently, the dimensions of individualism-collectivism and idiocentrism-allocentrism, again suggesting the basic character of the S and O motives, have been intensively discussed and investigated (Lau, 1992; Schwarz, 1990; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1998).

In valuation theory, it is assumed that the basic motives are reflected in the affective component of a valuation. This can be illustrated using two different valuations:

- "At home I often get my way by pushing just a little bit"

- "I feel fantastic when I paint a good picture"

Assuming that feelings of "strength" and "pride" are general indicators of the self-enhancement motive (S motive), the presence of these feelings in both of the valuations is evidence that they are expressions of the same, underlying motive. Put differently, the valuations pertain to quite different aspects of the self (they differ on the manifest level), although they may be rooted in the same basic motive (they are similar on the latent level). In this theoretical construction the affective component provides the bridge between motivation and valuation. The affect associated with a valuation can be considered as an expression of the basic motives from the latent level.

Some valuations representing the longing for contact and union with the other (O motive) follow:

- "During the stormy weather on the North Sea, I felt a real bond with my brother: I felt lost in the elements, yet still remained standing without having to struggle to be strong." -

- "Singing in a group: The way I express most of my feelings."

Both of the valuations from the same client - although clearly different manifestations of the self - imply strong feelings of intimacy and love. If feelings of intimacy nd love are assumed to be indicators of the O motive, then the two valuations can again be seen to differ on the manifest level but not on the latent level.

In close correspondence with S and O feelings, well-being, in the form of the difference between positive and negative feelings, plays a central role in valuation theory. The rationale is that obstacles are met on the path towards fulfillment of basic motives. People are purposefully oriented to the world, but obstacles often prevent the achievement of their goals, resulting in negative feelings. On the other hand, when something is achieved, or obstacles and hindrances successfully overcome, they are rewarded with positive feelings. It is supposed that each valuation is associated with a pattern of positive and negative feelings so that the emphasis of one of the two types of affect may give information about the extent to which basic motives are gratified.