Alfonsus Vargas: Introduction
Not much is known about Vargas’s life.
Vargas was probably born around 1300, in
Works
Vargas’s main writings consist of a Commentary on the first book of the
Sentences, and a set of Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima (= QDA). Manuscripts
and editions of the Sentences Commentary are listed in Kürzinger (1930) and
Trapp (1956). Kürzinger also mentions early editions of the Questions On the
Soul, but Lohr (1967-74) is more informative in this respect: he mentions one
codex, of 1475: Cremona B.Governativa 113 (Nl-12193), and several printed
editions (477, 1565, 1566, 1608 and 1609). According to Zumkeller (1966)
two questions of the QDA have survived in another manuscript (at the
Augustinian Historical Institute,
Kürzinger’s monography offers a
detailed list of the questions of the Commentary, an extensive list of authors
quoted by Vargas, and a doctrinal analysis of the Prologue of the Commentary.
The list of cited authors includes references to their works. Kürzinger
characterizes Vargas as “conservative and moderate” (p. 32), and his work as
“expressly oriented towards polemical dispute, and, in its theses and
explanations, fully geared to controversy” (p. 39).
At Kürzingers time there were almost no
critical editions of the relevant authors. This is still the case when Trapp
discusses the Commentary on the Sentences with an eye on the authors that are
quoted in it (Trapp, 1956). So it takes some effort to follow up the
references. Nevertheless Trapp’s listing of cited authors is very informative.
He notes that the commentary “is remarkable as a literary history of the
Augustinian Schola Moderna and the 14th century in general” (p. 215). The list
of cited authors runs up to 40 names. The top-five are: Scotus (31 times),
Aureol (30), Ockham (20), Landulfus (18) and, ex aequo, Francis of Meyronnes,
Michael of Massa and John Rodington (15).
Chronology
Concerning the dates of Vargas’s writings, Kürzinger
believes that the QDA were completed before the Sentences Commentary. “One may
conclude this both from the general practice to treat philosophy before
theology and from the fact that Alfonsus, in his Sentences Commentary, from
among the works of Aristotle significantly often quotes the De Anima; even when he [in the Sentences Commentary]
does not formally refer to his Commentary [on the De Anima], this great
familiarity with the original shows that he certainly has been studying it in
more detail. Moreover, it would be difficult to situate the completion of this
philosophical work later in time, since Alfonsus left his scientific career
soon after the completion of his Sentences Commentary. Perhaps the whole
character of the Commentary on Aristotle, with its close adherence to the
teacher of the order, Giles, permits us to see it as an author’s first work.”
(p. 22; text in square brackets added by me). Tachau (1988, p. 371), probably
accepting Kürzingers reasoning, also
qualifies the Questions On the Souls as the earlier work.
According to Kürzinger Vargas lectured
on the Sentences in 1344-1345, whereas the definitive redaction of the
Sentences Commentary must have taken form “between 1346 – 48”, because Vargas
is mentioned as a master in 1348 (p. 23). Marcolino argues that Vargas read the
Sentences at the Augustinian convent in
If these dates are correct and if
Kürzingers arguments are valid, then Vargas must have completed his QDA before
1344. However, the arguments of Kürzinger are not very convincing. It is by now
well known that medieval masters sometimes wrote commentaries on Aristotle
after having obtained their degree in theology. Vargas could have done so too,
perhaps in the years between 1348 and 1353 (after having completed the edition
of his Sentences commentary, supposedly in 1348). In fact, the text of the De
Anima commentary strongly suggests this possibility for the following reasons.
In the QDA Vargas discusses many opinions, almost exclusively however of
theologians (e.g.: Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of
Fontaines, Duns Scotus, Durand of St Pourcain, Peter Auriol, James of Viterbo).
By itself this is not remarkable, since most philosophical writings of that
period originate with theologians. However, at places the arguments presented
by Vargas and the discussion itself are
predominantly of a theological nature. The first happens in the question of the
plurality of substantial forms (Q
2.1.2), where an extensive disucussion
is devoted to a theological argument, according to four different approaches.
The second happens in the question on the relative excellence of intellect and
will, where the second article or subquestion (Q 3.3.2) asks whether beatitude formally is an act of the intellect
or an act of the will, which is a purely
theological question. Vargas discusses the views of Thomas, Godfrey and Durand,
and finally sides with the teachings “of our doctors”. But even if Vargas often
shows “close adherence to the teacher of the order, Giles”, he certainly does
not do so unconditionally. He is not afraid to reject the the views of Giles,
when he finds them wanting for some reason. For example, in the question
concerning the internal senses and their localization (2.6.3) Vargas’s opinion
is not that of Giles.
These features of the text point to an
author who is familiar with the theological literature of the time, who is well
versed in matters of theology, and who feels confident enough to criticize and
refute the opinion of highly respected
masters (in the editions of the QDA often referred to as ‘magni doctores’).
This suggests that Vargas composed the QDA after having completed his
theological studies, after reading the Sentences (1344-1345), or perhaps after
procuring the edition of his Sentences Commentary (not later than 1348). The
purpose of the book may have been to provide a summary of opinions on essential
issues concerning the soul, to be used by students of the augustinian order. The
fact that the author does not present highly controversial views but generally
stays with what might be called the majority view (at least in augustinian
circles) would support this textbook-interpretation of the work, as does the
fact that the work was printed several times (1477, 1565, 1566, 1608 and
1609). (The textbook-interpretation is corroborated by the dedication letter of
the 1566-edition, where the editor, Iordanus Zilettus, mentions that he has
been urged by teachers at
Now, given the fact that Vargas’s
interlocutors appear to be theologians mainly, and supposing that the QQ De
Anima were indeed composed after 1348, then an interesting question arises: was
Vargas familiar with various contemporaneous De-Anima commentaries prevailing
in the Arts Faculty, and did he use them in his own work? Possible candidates
here are the commentaries of John of Jandun (before 1328), Buridan (before
1347) and, perhaps Oresme (ca 1346-1348). To answer this question is one of the
aims of the current project (the other being Vargas’s dealing with scotistic
doctrines).
Although the hypothesis that Vargas's
QDA is a later work may be quite plausible, there is a potentially undermining
problem: Vargas's age. If he was indeed born in 1300, and if he read the
Sentences in his early forties, then te question is: what did he do before? If
his was not a late calling, then he might have been studying the arts and even
theology before he came to
The questions on the
De Anima: structure and contetns
The QDA comprise 12 main questions
(‘quaestiones principales’). Each principal question has three articles which
are rather subquestions; the first two articles or subquestions are in general
preparatory to the third one, which is actually dealing with the topic of the
main question (‘quod quaerit quaestio principalis’). The format of each main
question is expressly dialectical: it opens with just one argument for a
negative answer, and one for a positive answer; each argument then gives rise
to one subquestion; the third article finally resolves the main question in a
kind of synthesis.
All in all, there are at least 36 subquestions;
a few more, if we take into account the fact that each of the three articles of
2.4 is again divided in two separate subquestions. There are three principal
questions for the first book of Aristotle’s On the Soul (actually dealing with
its so-called Prologue only), six for the second book, and three for the third book. Vargas’s principal
questions are numbered starting with 1 for each book of Aristoteles’ De Anima.
To refer to a particular subquestion (article), I will use a three-digit code, indicating
respectively the book, the main quaestion and the article or subquestion. For
example, 2.4.3 refers to the third article of the fourth question on the second
book of On the Soul (“Utrum potentiae animae distinguantur inter se realiter”).
Index Quaestionum
The following index is taken from the Venice-edition (1566); it gives
the impression of being somewhat perfunctory: There are some errors in it and
sometimes the wording of a questions differs from that in the main text.
Quaestiones Libri Primi.
Quaestio prima: Utrum ex nobilitate et perfectione
subiecti adaequati formaliter sumpti arguatur de necessitate nobilitas et
perfectio habitus scientifici.
Articulus primus: Utrum unitas specifica habitus
scientifici summatur ex unitate subiecti formaliter sumpti.
Articulus secundus: In quo genere causae se habet
subiectum ad scientiam in specificando eam.
Articulus tertius:
Quod quaerit quaestio principalis
Quaestio secunda: Utrum anima sit
subiectum in hoc libro.
Articulus primus: Utrum sit idem esse subiectum in
scientia et esse de consideratione scientiae.
Articulus secundus: Qualis adaequatio debeat poni
inter habitum et subiectum.
Articulus tertius: Quod quaerit quaestio
principalis.
Quaestio tertia: Utrum universale sit verum ens
reale habens esse praeter operationem
intellectus vel sit tantum ens rationis habens esse tantum per operationem
intellectus.
Articulus primus: Utrum unitas specifica sit unitas
realis.
Articulus secundus: Utrum ratio entis dicta in
communi de deo et creatura sit una ratio
realis.
Articulus tertius: Quod quaerit quaestio
principalis.
Quaestiones Libri Secundi
Quaestio prima: Utrum anima intellectiva sit forma
corporis humani.
Articulus primus: Utrum materia possit existere
sine forma.
Articulus secundus:Utrum in uno composito possint
esse plures formae substantiales.
Articulus tertius: Quod quaerit quaestio
principalis.
Quaestio secunda: Utrum anima intellectiva
coniuncta corpori extendatur extensione corporis.
Articulus primus: Quae est ratio susceptiva seu
receptiva quantitatis.
Articulus secundus: Utrum alique formae
substantiales extendantur extensione corporis.
Articulus tertius: Utrum anima intellectiva sit
extensa.
Quaestio tertia: Utrum anima intellectiva
distinguatur realiter a suis potentiis.
Articulus primus: Utrum forma substantialis possit
esse mediatum principium suae operationis. [Main text: immediatum principium]
Articulus secundus: Utrum anima vegetativa realiter
distinguatur a suis potentiis.
Articulus tertius: Quod quaerit quaestio principalis.
Quaestio quarta: Utrum potentiae animae
distinguantur inter se realiter.
Articulus primus: Utrum inter extrema realia quorum
utrumque est res possit esse distinctio rationis.
Articulus secundus: Utrum distinguantur per obiecta
[Main text: Utrum actus distinguantur].
Articulus tertius: Quod quaerit questio
principalis.
Quaestio quinta: Utrum potentiae originentur ab
anima.
Articulus primus: Utrum unum et idem respectu
eiusdem possit esse activum et passivum.
Articulus secundus: Utrum subiectum habeat aliquam
causam effectivam supra suas proprias passiones.
Articulus tertius:
Quod quaerit quaestio principalis.
Quaestio sexta: Utrum sensus sit susceptivus
specierum secundum materiam [Main text: sine materia].
Articulus primus: Utrum species sive intentiones
rerum sensibilium habeant in medio esse
reale vel tantum intentionale.
Articulus secundus: Utrum sit dare aliquem sensum
agentem qui habeat virtutem aliquam effectivam respectu talium specierum.
Articulus tertius: Quod quaerit
quaestio principalis.
Quaestiones Libri Tertii
Quaestio prima: Utrum primo cognitionem ab
intellectu nostro sit aliquod universale [Main text: primum cognitum].
Articulus primus: Utrum primo cognitionem ab intellectu nostro sit aliqua species
specialissima immediate abstracta a singularibus [Main text: primum cognitum].
Articulus secundus: Utrum obiectum adaequatum
intellectus nostri sit quidditas rei materialis vel ens.
Articulus tertius: Quod quaerit quaestio
principalis.
Quaestio secunda: Utrum intellectus agens sit totalis
causa effectiva actus intelligendi.
Articulus primus: Utrum intellectus agens sit
aliquid animae.
Articulus secundus Utrum intellectus agens sit
ponere animae nostrae distincta ab intellectu possibili [Main text: sit
potentia aliqua animae].
Articulus tertius: Quod quaerit
quaestio principalis.
Quaestio tertia et ultima: Utrum intellectus sit
nobilior potentia quam voluntas vel e converso.
Articulus primus: Utrum idem sub eadem ratione
formali sit obiectum intellectus et voluntatis.
Articulus secundus: Utrum beatitudo qua formaliter
homo beatificatur consistat in actu intellectus
vel voluntatis.
Articulus tertius:
Quod quaerit quaestio principalis.
The edition by Nicalas of
I started my study of Vargas (in january, 2005) by using the text of
the 1477-edition (henceforward denoted by F) as made available in pdf-format by
Gallica (http://gallica.bnf.fr/) in two
copies, apparently based on two different printed copies of the same 1477-edition.
At places the typography of the copies is very bad, but taken together they
offer a manageable representation of the original (printed) text. F does not
have page numbers. When printed, both files are composed identically in terms
of 238 physical pages, presumably
corresponding to 119 folios in the 1477-edition.
F does have a few headings of a sort, but they are not present in a
systematic and consistent way and they often interrupt the text in an
unexpected manner. I assume that these short labels were added by the
editor/printer, Nicolas of Florence.
The edition by Iordanus Zilettus (
When I got hold of a copy of this
edition (= V; from the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek at Munich), I came to regret
having spent so much time on the 1477-edition (I had transcribed QQ 1.3, 2.1,
2.2, 2.6, 3.1 and 3.2, and extracted the conclusions of the remaining QQ). As
already noted by Kürzinger (1930), the 1566-edition is typographically
excellent, and has many marginal notes referring to sources. In addition it has
two proudly announced indices: one table of contents, listing the quaestions
and their articles, and one subject index, containing “everything that is worth
to be known”. In contrast to F, V does
not insert ‘headings’ in the text, but puts them neatly in the margins.
The 1608-edition
Steneck (1979) compared the editions of
1477 and of 1608 with respect to his topic of interest, the internal senses,
disucussed by Vargas in Q.2.6. He concluded that “no substantial diferences
were found” (p. 209).
MS Cremona B. Governativa 113
(Nl-12193)
Thanks to the kind cooperation of the
MS
The Augustinian Historical Institute in
Manuscript vs printed editions
Based on collating the texts of Q 1.3 (on
universals) the following conclusions
can be put forward. First, the printed editions, F and V are essentially the
same, with the errors in F having been corrected in V. Where we felt that F would
need an emendation, V, as a rule, does actually have it, and where we were not
sure about the text in F, V provides an intelligible reading (not always,
though!). Incidental further comparisons confirmed the superiority of the
1566-edition: it has fewer printing errors and it clearly separates ‘editiorial
remarks’ from the text itself. As for the manuscripts, there are many non-trivial
differences between between C and N, and
in many cases N is closer to V than to C; however, there remain remarkable
differences between N and V. As a result, the sources can be classified as
follows: on the one hand we have C, on the other we have N, and FV.
The following differences between V (F)
and C may be mentioned. First, there are many differences in wording that do
not entail differences in meaning, such as stylistic variations (mostly in word
order) and the use of synonyms. The latter may range from innocent cases (like
quia/quoniam or cum/quando), to perhaps less innocent cases, involving more or
less technical terms (like ‘essentia’ in V instead of ‘natura’ in C, or ‘res’
in V instead of ‘ens’ in C); in the latter cases it is difficult to decide
whether differences in wording are a just matter of taste or style, or wether
they reflect more principled considerations. Next, there are differences that
may reflect rhetoric preferences of the editor or perhaps are due to a
conscious policy of emphasizing or obliterating doctrinal differences: cases where
V has an anonymized or more general reference than C (e.g. ‘magni doctores’ in
V vs ‘Scotus’ in C), or where one source uses the third person wheras the other
uses the person (e.g. ‘dicitur’ or ‘dicendum est’ in V vs ‘dico’ in C; or:
‘arguo’in V vs ‘arguitur’in C). Then there are textual variations that are definitely
of a more substantial nature. These variations are of two kinds. First, one or
more sentences that are present in C are
absent in V (or the other way round).
Secondly, a paragraph in V may be less comprehensible or even obviously
incorrect, whereas the corresponding paragraph in C appears to be right; or,
conversely, V may have a version that corrects an obviously incorrect text in
C. .
Provisional doctrinal profile of the QDA
Kürzinger’s study (1930) is dedicated
to the Commentary on the Sentences, but it includes a section on the QDA,
presenting the Tabula Quaestionum and a brief summary of Vargas’s philosophical
position in a number of questions (pp. 12-18). Another brief characterization is found in
volume II of Historia de la Filosofia Espaňola (Carreras Artau and
Carreras Artau, 1943, p. 490), which I will quote here, in order have at least
a preliminary impression of the man we are dealing with: “His [= Vargas’s]
specific contribution to Augustinism consists in purifying it from scotistic
intrusions, which is best seen in the area of psychology, where he refuses to
admit a plurality of forms in humans, the real identity of the soul and its
powers, of the powers between themselves, and of the powers and their acts. He
rejects the mere possibility that matter can exist by itself, without form. The
possible intellect consists in a natural disposition to receive the more
imperfect and more general concepts, in order to elaborate them ultimately in
other, more perfect concepts. This process of perfectioning is served by the
active intellect, which is a kind of light or habit, connatural to but really
distinct from the possible intellect. The object of human cognition is reality
in its full range. The universal is forged by the intellect, while outside the
intellect only the plurality of particulars exists. On the basis of the latter
our mind reduces them to conceptual unity. As for the will, he maintains the
classical voluntarism of all augustinian schools. In its operation the will
follows the intellect, but it precedes
the latter in nobility. Its happiness consists in the identification with God,
in the supreme act of love. Charity is the most excellent christian virtue.”
Acknowledgments
The work reported here would not have
been possible without the support of dr Paul Bakker of the Center for Medieval
and Renaissance Natural Philosophy of the Radboud University Nijmegen. I also
thank the reverend father Karl Gersbach OESA, of the Augustinian Historical
Institute in